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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
dictment. 24 However, the court appears to have been strongly
influenced by the fact that the "monitor" in this instance was
an investigator. While the court does not clearly indicate what
the result would have been if the investigator had also been a
stenographer, the general tenor of the opinion indicates that the
indictment would have been quashed in such a case. It appears,
however, that in order to promote the efficiency of grand jury
proceedings, a legislative change would be desirable, extending
the enumeration of Article 215 to include an individual to op-
erate a recording machine during sessions of the grand jury.
Such an amendment should clearly exclude members of the police
force and district attorneys' investigatory staff from the grand
jury sessions, except when present in their capacity as witnesses.
Patsy Jo McDowell
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - REMARKS OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY -
REFERENCE ON RETRIAL TO CONVICTION OF ACCUSED AT
FIRST TRIAL
Defendant's conviction on a charge of manslaughter was set
aside by the Supreme Court on a point of evidence. In his open-
ing statement on retrial, the district attorney referred to the
prior conviction of the defendant by the previous petit jury. The
trial judge refused to grant defendant's request to instruct the
jury to disregard the statement. On appeal, held, affirmed. The
defendant did not show, and the court could think of no way
in which the passing reference in good faith by the district at-
torney to the prior conviction was prejudicial to the cause of
the accused. Moreover, the indictment had been presented to
the jury with an endorsement thereon that the defendant had
been found guilty as charged. State v. Clark, 231 La. 807, 93
So.2d 13 (1957).
Some improper remarks by prosecuting attorneys may be
"cured" by the trial judge's instructions to the jury to disregard
them, while others are held to be "incurable," or reversible error
24. The court stated: "Our statute (RS 15:215) not only makes it mandatory
that the sessions of the grand jury be secret, but specifically enumerates the only
persons authorized to appear before that body. A 'monitor' or 'operator' of a
recording machine is not one of those enumerated, and we must conclude that until
provision is made in our law for the presence of such persons, it is not the province
of the court to hold they are included." State v. Revere, 232 La. 184, 199, 94
So.2d 25, 31 (1957).
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per se." An error is deemed to be incurable if it appears that its
prejudicial effect upon the jury is so great that the jury will be
utterly incapable of heeding the trial judge's admonition.2 Ar-
ticle 515 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that upon the retrial of a case the new trial is to be conducted
"with as little prejudice to either party as if it had never been
tried."8 References by prosecuting attorneys, upon retrial, to
the conviction of the defendant upon the first trial have resulted
in the consideration of this provision in two cases prior to the
instant case. In State v. Crittenden4 the defendant was charged
with manslaughter in the indictment but was convicted of neg-
ligent homicide, then a responsive verdict, at the first trial.
The Supreme Court held that since the new trial was had upon
the original indictment it was not error for the prosecutor to
read the indictment and former verdict to the jury.6 This ruling
was inescapable, for it is well settled that a verdict of guilty of
a lesser crime operates as an implied acquittal of the greater
crime7 and it was necessary that the jury understand that it
1. State v. Hoover, 219 La. 872, 54 So.2d 130 (1951); State v. Moore, 212
La. 943, 33 So.2d 691 (1947) ; Comment, Improper Remarks of the District At-
torney, 10 LOUISLANA LAW REVIEW 486 (1950).
2. The two major types of incurable remarks are those which directly or in-
directly bring attention to the fact that the accused has failed to testify (the
cases of State v. Hoover, 219 La. 872, 54 So.2d 130 (1951) and State v. Bentley,
219 La. 893, 54 So.2d 137 (1951) contain an exhaustive and excellent history of
the jurisprudence on this point and Chief Justice Fournet, in the Bentley opinion,
traces the development of the rule from its beginning as a reaction to the in-
quisitorial oaths of the Ecclesiastical and Star Chamber courts) and those which
appeal to prejudice (State v. Moore, 212 La. 943, 33 So.2d 691 (1947) ; State v.
Bedford, 193 La. 104, 190 So. 347 (1939) ; Comment, Improper Remarks of the
District Attorney, 10 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 486 (1950)).
3. The statutes of many states expressly prohibit the use of or reference to the
former verdict or finding. See, e.g., 17 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rule 314 (1939) ;
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2205 (1947); CALIF. PENAL CODE § 1180 (1949); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 787.4 (1946) ; MO. STAT. ANN. § 547.010 (Vernon 1949); NEW
YORK CODE CRIM. PROC. § 464 (1953) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. 22:951 (1937); Wis.
STAT. C. 958.06(3) (1955). The provisions of each of these statutes are, with
insignificant modifications of expression, like the ALI Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure provision: "When a new trial is granted, such new trial shall proceed
in all respects as if no former trial had been had. On the new trial the defendant
may be convicted of any offense charged in the indictment or information irrespec-
tive of the verdict or finding on the former trial. The former verdict or finding
shall not be used or referred to in evidence or argument on the new trial." (Em-
phasis added.) ALI CODE CRIM. PROC. § 368 (1930).
4. 218 La. 333, 49 So.2d 418 (1950).
5. Under the new responsive verdict statute, the only responsive verdicts to
a charge of manslaughter are "guilty as charged" and "not guilty." LA. R.S.
15:386 (1950).
6. To the same effect, see State v. Smith, 49 La. Ann. 1515, 22 So. 882 (1897).
In that case, decided before the adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the
accused had been found guilty of manslaughter at the first trial on a charge of
murder.
7. It is well settled that a verdict of guilty of a lesser crime operates as an
implied acquittal of the greater crime. State v. Adams, 210 La. 782, 28 So.2d
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could not convict the accused of manslaughter. In State v.
Holmes" the court declared that if defense counsel brings up the
fact that the former conviction was reversed, it is not error for
the prosecutor to point out that the Supreme Court does not
pass upon the guilt or innocence of the accused.9 This decision
was justified on the ground that the prosecutor's comments were
necessary in order to counteract any inferences favorable to de-
fendant which the jury might draw from the court's reversal. 10
In each of these cases the court observed that any possible prej-
udice to the accused's cause was negated by the trial judge's in-
struction to the jury that the former verdict was entitled to no
weight."
In the instant case, the first trial jury had convicted the ac-
cused of the crime charged in the indictment. There was, there-
fore, no need for the subsequent jury to know of the previous
conviction in order that it might be aware of an implied ac-
quittal, as in the Crittenden case. Nor had defense counsel made
any reference to the former proceedings which might have justi-
fied the prosecutor's explanation of the scope of the Supreme
Court's review or the nature of the court's reversal, as in the
Holmes decision. Indeed, the opinion discloses that the state-
ment was made without necessity, and in this respect presented
a more aggravated situation than had theretofore been before
the court. In the course of the opinion, Chief Justice Fournet
conceded that it would be "better practice" for the trial judge
in similar cases to instruct the jury to disregard a reference to
a prior trial and conviction. He went on to state, however, that
the court could think of no way in which defendant's cause had
been prejudiced by the statement or by the trial judge's refusal
to so instruct. It is not possible to tell from the opinion whether
the court considers that an unnecessary reference to a prior
conviction is harmless error or no error at all. Since the jury in
269 (1946) ; State v. Love, 210 La. 11, 26 So.2d 156 (1946) ; State v. Pace, 174
La. 295, 140 So. 482 (1932) ; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1946-1947 Term -Criminal Law and Procedure, 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 281,
300 (1948).
8. 224 La. 941, 71 So.2d 335 (1954).
9. To the same effect, see State v. Scarborough, 152 La. 669, 94 So. 204
(1922), decided before the adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
10. The Texas court has held that even if defense counsel tells the jury that
accused was "acquitted" of the crime charged, it is reversible error, not curable
by instructions of the trial judge, for the prosecutor to point out that accused
was convicted of a lesser crime. Hart v. State, 276 S.W. 233 (Tex. Crim. 1925).
. 11. In the HolmC decision, it was presumed that the judge had properly in-
structed the jury as the bill of exceptions did not state otherwise..
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the instant case had been handed the indictment with the verdict
endorsed thereon prior to the statement by the prosecutor, there
is a possibility that future cases will limit the decision to these
facts. However, the court refers to these facts only after it
states that accused's cause was not prejudiced by the statement,
and the reference appears to be in the nature of makeweight or
afterthought rather than a basis of the decision. 12 Furthermore,
even if the court's view that the accused suffered no prejudice
were based on the fact that the jury had probably seen the
former verdict, this would not justify the prosecutor's empha-
sizing the prior conviction nor the trial judge's refusal appro-
priately to instruct the jury to the effect that the prior convic-
tion should be completely disregarded and should be given no
probative effect. It would appear, therefore, that the instant
case has gone considerably further than the previous decisions
in allowing the prosecutor to call the jury's attention to the fact
of defendant's conviction at the former trial.
The court appears to have given weight to the following
three factors: the remark was made during the district attor-
ney's opening statement and was therefore not "evidence" ;13 the
district attorney was apparently in good faith in making the
statement; and the defendant did not show in what manner his
cause was prejudiced. The first two factors do not appear sig-
nificant, for it is the prejudicial effect upon the jury rather than
the technical classification of the statement or the prosecutor's
motive in making it which is the important consideration. The
court's primary concern appears to have been with the third
factor; that the defendant did not show, to the court's satis-
faction, in what manner his cause was prejudiced. 4 However,
the court has often presumed prejudice to the defendant from
improper remarks, as, for example, when the prosecutor calls
12. The court, after pointing out at some length that accused had suffered no
prejudice, said that "moreover it is difficult for us to understand how under the
circumstances this information could have been kept from the jury" as the
jury had been handed the indictment with the verdict endorsed on it. 231 La. 807,
814, 93 So.2d 13, 15 (1957).
13. The court stated that it is obvious that the opening statement forms no
part of the evidence, for it must be made "prior to the introducion of the evi-
dence," citing State v. Daleo, 179 La. 516, 154 So. 437 (1934) and State v. Ricks,
170 La. 507, 128 So. 292 (1930).
14. "No judgment shall be set aside, or a new trial granted by any appellate
court of this state, in any criminal case, on the grounds of misdirection of the
jury or the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or as to error of any
matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court to which ap-
plication is made, after an examination of the entire record, it appears that the
error complained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justicei is prejudicial
19571
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attention to the fact that the accused has not testified15 or ap-
peals to racial prejudice. 16 In State v. Fletcher,17 a case which is
closely analogous to those under consideration though not in-
volving a former trial, the district attorney had told the jury
that in acquitting the accused "you would be saying the Grand
Jury made a mistake." The Supreme Court, speaking through
the author of the opinion in the instant case, held that the in-
struction of the judge that the indictment was mere accusation
and not evidence did not cure the error since "it is highly prob-
able that it [the statement] did influence the jury in arriving at
its verdict."1 8 (Emphasis added.)
A reference to a prior trial and conviction is likewise so
fraught with possible injury that prejudice should be presumed.
Ordinarily, elaborate argument and instruction are presented to
the jury in order to impress it with the idea that a petit jury
must be convinced of the accused's guilt beyond all reasonable
doubt before convicting him. Therefore, if the jury trying the
accused becomes aware of tlhe fact that a previous jury, similarly
instructed, has convicted the accused of the crime for which he
is presently being tried, it seems inevitable that it will give con-
siderable weight to the former verdict. The mandate of Article
515 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that a retrial is to be
conducted "with as little prejudice to either party as if it had
never been tried" appears to be directed primarily at proscribing
such use of the former proceedings. Indeed, it is difficult to
conceive of an aspect of the first trial which would be more
detrimental to the accused's cause than the previous trial jury's
verdict of guilty. This fact is recognized in the statutes of many
states which expressly provide that "the former verdict or find-
ing shall not be used or referred to in evidence or argument on
the new trial."1 9 Furthermore, once the jury acquires knowledge
of the former trial and conviction, it is quite unlikely that it
to the substantial rights of the accused, or constitutes a substantial violation of a
constitutional or statutory right." LA. R.S. 15:557 (1950).
15. See notes 1 and 2 supra.
16. See notes 1 and 2 supra.
17. 210 La. 409, 27 So.2d 179 (1946).
18. State v. Fletcher, 210 La. 409, 420, 27 So.2d 179, 183 (1946). See also
State v. Jackson, 106 La. 413, 31 So. 52 (1901), in which it was held that the
introduction of an affidavit in evidence in order to refute the defense counsel's
implication that a certain witness had made it was incurable reversible error
"since the affidavit was a sworn declaration of the defendant's having committed
the crime for which he was on trial, and therefore may have influenced the jury."
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 414, 31 So. at 53.
19. See note 3 supra.
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will be capable of heeding the trial judge's admonition not to
give weight to the conviction. On the strength of these considera-
tions, it is submitted that, absent absolute necessity, 2 a refer-
ence by a prosecuting attorney on retrial to the conviction of the
accused by a previous petit jury should be treated as incurable
reversible error.
Closely related to this problem are the difficulties which arise
from the present practice of using the original indictment on re-
trial. Since the verdict rendered at the first trial is endorsed
upon the original indictment, the jury will usually become aware
of the former verdict through an examination of the indictment.
This could be avoided by adopting a procedure under which a
certified copy of the indictment would be used in a case in which
the accused has been convicted of the crime charged. If the con-
viction at the first trial is of a lesser crime than that charged,
it would probably be necessary to obtain a new indictment or a
new bill of information for the retrial, in order to change the
crime charged. 21 Another solution would be to make it the statu-
tory duty of the trial judge in such a case to amend the indict-
ment so as to charge the lesser crime. Under this proposed pro-
cedure, all knowledge of the former trial and verdict could be
kept from the jury and the objective of Article 515 would be
greatly furthered.
Daniel J. McGee
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-REVIEW OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION CASES
In an action brought in federal district court,' solely on the
basis of diversity of citizenship,2 plaintiff recovered for injuries
sustained in an oil field accident. Defendant appealed from
denial of motions for directed verdict and judgment non obstante
veredicto, and on exceptions to instructions to the jury. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that defendant's motion for
directed verdict should have been granted.3 Plaintiff petitioned
20. The only "absolute necessity" situation would appear to be that presented
in the Crittenden case, that is, a case in which the accused has-been convicted of
a lesser crime than that charged at a previous trial and it is necessary to explain
the implied acquittal theory to the present jury. A remedy to this problem Is
proposed in the following paragraph.
21. See note 7 aupra.
1. United States District Court for the Western District of Texas (unre-
ported).
2. Plaintiff was a citizen of Texas; defendant was incorporated under the.laws
of Delaware.
3. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Gibson, 232 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1956).
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